下載App 希平方
攻其不背
App 開放下載中
下載App 希平方
攻其不背
App 開放下載中
IE版本不足
您的瀏覽器停止支援了😢使用最新 Edge 瀏覽器或點選連結下載 Google Chrome 瀏覽器 前往下載

免費註冊
! 這組帳號已經註冊過了
Email 帳號
密碼請填入 6 位數以上密碼
已經有帳號了?
忘記密碼
! 這組帳號已經註冊過了
您的 Email
請輸入您註冊時填寫的 Email,
我們將會寄送設定新密碼的連結給您。
寄信了!請到信箱打開密碼連結信
密碼信已寄至
沒有收到信嗎?
如果您尚未收到信,請前往垃圾郵件查看,謝謝!

恭喜您註冊成功!

查看會員功能

註冊未完成

《HOPE English 希平方》服務條款關於個人資料收集與使用之規定

隱私權政策
上次更新日期:2014-12-30

希平方 為一英文學習平台,我們每天固定上傳優質且豐富的影片內容,讓您不但能以有趣的方式學習英文,還能增加內涵,豐富知識。我們非常注重您的隱私,以下說明為當您使用我們平台時,我們如何收集、使用、揭露、轉移及儲存你的資料。請您花一些時間熟讀我們的隱私權做法,我們歡迎您的任何疑問或意見,提供我們將產品、服務、內容、廣告做得更好。

本政策涵蓋的內容包括:希平方學英文 如何處理蒐集或收到的個人資料。
本隱私權保護政策只適用於: 希平方學英文 平台,不適用於非 希平方學英文 平台所有或控制的公司,也不適用於非 希平方學英文 僱用或管理之人。

個人資料的收集與使用
當您註冊 希平方學英文 平台時,我們會詢問您姓名、電子郵件、出生日期、職位、行業及個人興趣等資料。在您註冊完 希平方學英文 帳號並登入我們的服務後,我們就能辨認您的身分,讓您使用更完整的服務,或參加相關宣傳、優惠及贈獎活動。希平方學英文 也可能從商業夥伴或其他公司處取得您的個人資料,並將這些資料與 希平方學英文 所擁有的您的個人資料相結合。

我們所收集的個人資料, 將用於通知您有關 希平方學英文 最新產品公告、軟體更新,以及即將發生的事件,也可用以協助改進我們的服務。

我們也可能使用個人資料為內部用途。例如:稽核、資料分析、研究等,以改進 希平方公司 產品、服務及客戶溝通。

瀏覽資料的收集與使用
希平方學英文 自動接收並記錄您電腦和瀏覽器上的資料,包括 IP 位址、希平方學英文 cookie 中的資料、軟體和硬體屬性以及您瀏覽的網頁紀錄。

隱私權政策修訂
我們會不定時修正與變更《隱私權政策》,不會在未經您明確同意的情況下,縮減本《隱私權政策》賦予您的權利。隱私權政策變更時一律會在本頁發佈;如果屬於重大變更,我們會提供更明顯的通知 (包括某些服務會以電子郵件通知隱私權政策的變更)。我們還會將本《隱私權政策》的舊版加以封存,方便您回顧。

服務條款
歡迎您加入看 ”希平方學英文”
上次更新日期:2013-09-09

歡迎您加入看 ”希平方學英文”
感謝您使用我們的產品和服務(以下簡稱「本服務」),本服務是由 希平方學英文 所提供。
本服務條款訂立的目的,是為了保護會員以及所有使用者(以下稱會員)的權益,並構成會員與本服務提供者之間的契約,在使用者完成註冊手續前,應詳細閱讀本服務條款之全部條文,一旦您按下「註冊」按鈕,即表示您已知悉、並完全同意本服務條款的所有約定。如您是法律上之無行為能力人或限制行為能力人(如未滿二十歲之未成年人),則您在加入會員前,請將本服務條款交由您的法定代理人(如父母、輔助人或監護人)閱讀,並得到其同意,您才可註冊及使用 希平方學英文 所提供之會員服務。當您開始使用 希平方學英文 所提供之會員服務時,則表示您的法定代理人(如父母、輔助人或監護人)已經閱讀、了解並同意本服務條款。 我們可能會修改本條款或適用於本服務之任何額外條款,以(例如)反映法律之變更或本服務之變動。您應定期查閱本條款內容。這些條款如有修訂,我們會在本網頁發佈通知。變更不會回溯適用,並將於公布變更起十四天或更長時間後方始生效。不過,針對本服務新功能的變更,或基於法律理由而為之變更,將立即生效。如果您不同意本服務之修訂條款,則請停止使用該本服務。

第三人網站的連結 本服務或協力廠商可能會提供連結至其他網站或網路資源的連結。您可能會因此連結至其他業者經營的網站,但不表示希平方學英文與該等業者有任何關係。其他業者經營的網站均由各該業者自行負責,不屬希平方學英文控制及負責範圍之內。

兒童及青少年之保護 兒童及青少年上網已經成為無可避免之趨勢,使用網際網路獲取知識更可以培養子女的成熟度與競爭能力。然而網路上的確存有不適宜兒童及青少年接受的訊息,例如色情與暴力的訊息,兒童及青少年有可能因此受到心靈與肉體上的傷害。因此,為確保兒童及青少年使用網路的安全,並避免隱私權受到侵犯,家長(或監護人)應先檢閱各該網站是否有保護個人資料的「隱私權政策」,再決定是否同意提出相關的個人資料;並應持續叮嚀兒童及青少年不可洩漏自己或家人的任何資料(包括姓名、地址、電話、電子郵件信箱、照片、信用卡號等)給任何人。

為了維護 希平方學英文 網站安全,我們需要您的協助:

您承諾絕不為任何非法目的或以任何非法方式使用本服務,並承諾遵守中華民國相關法規及一切使用網際網路之國際慣例。您若係中華民國以外之使用者,並同意遵守所屬國家或地域之法令。您同意並保證不得利用本服務從事侵害他人權益或違法之行為,包括但不限於:
A. 侵害他人名譽、隱私權、營業秘密、商標權、著作權、專利權、其他智慧財產權及其他權利;
B. 違反依法律或契約所應負之保密義務;
C. 冒用他人名義使用本服務;
D. 上載、張貼、傳輸或散佈任何含有電腦病毒或任何對電腦軟、硬體產生中斷、破壞或限制功能之程式碼之資料;
E. 干擾或中斷本服務或伺服器或連結本服務之網路,或不遵守連結至本服務之相關需求、程序、政策或規則等,包括但不限於:使用任何設備、軟體或刻意規避看 希平方學英文 - 看 YouTube 學英文 之排除自動搜尋之標頭 (robot exclusion headers);

服務中斷或暫停
本公司將以合理之方式及技術,維護會員服務之正常運作,但有時仍會有無法預期的因素導致服務中斷或故障等現象,可能將造成您使用上的不便、資料喪失、錯誤、遭人篡改或其他經濟上損失等情形。建議您於使用本服務時宜自行採取防護措施。 希平方學英文 對於您因使用(或無法使用)本服務而造成的損害,除故意或重大過失外,不負任何賠償責任。

版權宣告
上次更新日期:2013-09-16

希平方學英文 內所有資料之著作權、所有權與智慧財產權,包括翻譯內容、程式與軟體均為 希平方學英文 所有,須經希平方學英文同意合法才得以使用。
希平方學英文歡迎你分享網站連結、單字、片語、佳句,使用時須標明出處,並遵守下列原則:

  • 禁止用於獲取個人或團體利益,或從事未經 希平方學英文 事前授權的商業行為
  • 禁止用於政黨或政治宣傳,或暗示有支持某位候選人
  • 禁止用於非希平方學英文認可的產品或政策建議
  • 禁止公佈或傳送任何誹謗、侮辱、具威脅性、攻擊性、不雅、猥褻、不實、色情、暴力、違反公共秩序或善良風俗或其他不法之文字、圖片或任何形式的檔案
  • 禁止侵害或毀損希平方學英文或他人名譽、隱私權、營業秘密、商標權、著作權、專利權、其他智慧財產權及其他權利、違反法律或契約所應付支保密義務
  • 嚴禁謊稱希平方學英文辦公室、職員、代理人或發言人的言論背書,或作為募款的用途

網站連結
歡迎您分享 希平方學英文 網站連結,與您的朋友一起學習英文。

抱歉傳送失敗!

不明原因問題造成傳送失敗,請儘速與我們聯繫!
希平方 x ICRT

「Dan Ariely:我們的決定,我們掌控嗎?」- Are We in Control of Our Decisions?

觀看次數:3027  • 

框選或點兩下字幕可以直接查字典喔!

I'll tell you a little bit about irrational behavior. Not yours, of course—other people's.

So after being at MIT for a few years, I realized that writing academic papers is not that exciting. You know, I don't know how many of those you read, but it's not fun to read and often not fun to write—even worse to write. So I decided to try and write something more fun. And I came up with an idea that I would write a cookbook. And the title for my cookbook was going to be, "Dining Without Crumbs: The Art of Eating Over the Sink."

And it was going to be a look at life through the kitchen. I was quite excited about this. I was going to talk a little bit about research, a little bit about the kitchen. We do so much in the kitchen, I thought this would be interesting. I wrote a couple of chapters, and took it to MIT Press and they said, "Cute, but not for us. Go and find somebody else."

I tried other people, and everybody said the same thing, "Cute. Not for us."

Until somebody said, "Look, if you're serious about this, you have to write about your research first; you have to publish something, then you'll get the opportunity to write something else. If you really want to do it, you have to do it."

I said, "I don't want to write about my research. I do it all day long, I want to write something a bit more free, less constrained."

And this person was very forceful and said, "Look, that's the only way you'll ever do it."

So I said, "Okay, if I have to do it—" I had a sabbatical. I said, "I'll write about my research, if there's no other way. And then I'll get to do my cookbook." So, I wrote a book on my research. And it turned out to be quite fun in two ways. First of all, I enjoyed writing. But the more interesting thing was that I started learning from people. It's a fantastic time to write, because there's so much feedback you can get from people. People write to me about their personal experience, and about their examples, and where they disagree, and their nuances. And even being here—I mean, the last few days, I've known heights of obsessive behavior I never thought about. Which I think is just fascinating.

I will tell you a little bit about irrational behavior, and I want to start by giving you some examples of visual illusion as a metaphor for rationality. So think about these two tables. And you must have seen this illusion. If I asked you what's longer, the vertical line on the table on the left, or the horizontal line on the table on the right, which one seems longer? Can anybody see anything but the left one being longer? No, right? It's impossible. But the nice thing about visual illusion is we can easily demonstrate mistakes. So I can put some lines on; it doesn't help. I can animate the lines. And to the extent you believe I didn't shrink the lines, which I didn't, I've proven to you that your eyes were deceiving you. Now, the interesting thing about this is when I take the lines away, it's as if you haven't learned anything in the last minute.

You can't look at this and say, "Now I see reality as it is." Right? It's impossible to overcome this sense that this is indeed longer. Our intuition is really fooling us in a repeatable, predictable, consistent way, and there is almost nothing we can do about it, aside from taking a ruler and starting to measure it.

Here's another one. It's one of my favorite illusions. What color is the top arrow pointing to?

Brown. Brown. Thank you. The bottom one? Yellow. Turns out they're identical. Can anybody see them as identical? Very, very hard. I can cover the rest of the cube up. If I cover the rest of the cube, you can see that they are identical. If you don't believe me, you can get the slide later and do some arts and crafts and see that they're identical. But again, it's the same story, that if we take the background away, the illusion comes back. Alright? There is no way for us not to see this illusion. I guess maybe if you're colorblind, I don't think you can see that. I want you to think about illusion as a metaphor.

Vision is one of the best things we do. We have a huge part of our brain dedicated to vision—bigger than dedicated to anything else. We use our vision more hours of the day than anything else. We're evolutionarily designed to use vision. And if we have these predictable repeatable mistakes in vision, which we're so good at, what are the chances we won't make even more mistakes in something we're not as good at, for example, financial decision-making.

Something we don't have an evolutionary reason to do, we don't have a specialized part of the brain for, and we don't do that many hours of the day. The argument is in those cases, it might be that we actually make many more mistakes. And worse—not having an easy way to see them, because in visual illusions, we can easily demonstrate the mistakes; in cognitive illusion it's much, much harder to demonstrate the mistakes to people.

So I want to show you some cognitive illusions, or decision-making illusions, in the same way. And this is one of my favorite plots in social sciences. It's from a paper by Johnson and Goldstein. It basically shows the percentage of people who indicated they would be interested in giving their organs to donation. These are different countries in Europe. You basically see two types of countries: countries on the right, that seem to be giving a lot; and countries on the left that seem to giving very little, or much less. The question is, why? Why do some countries give a lot and some countries give a little?

When you ask people this question, they usually think that it has to be about culture. How much do you care about people? Giving organs to somebody else is probably about how much you care about society, how linked you are. Or maybe it's about religion. But if you look at this plot, you can see that countries that we think about as very similar, actually exhibit very different behavior. For example, Sweden is all the way on the right, and Denmark, which we think is culturally very similar, is all the way on the left. Germany is on the left, and Austria is on the right. The Netherlands is on the left, and Belgium is on the right. And finally, depending on your particular version of European similarity, you can think about the U.K. and France as either similar culturally or not, but it turns out that with organ donation, they are very different.

By the way, the Netherlands is an interesting story. You see, the Netherlands is kind of the biggest of the small group. It turns out that they got to 28 percent after mailing every household in the country a letter, begging people to join this organ donation program. You know the expression, "Begging only gets you so far." It's 28 percent in organ donation.

But whatever the countries on the right are doing, they're doing a much better job than begging. So what are they doing? Turns out the secret has to do with a form at the DMV. And here is the story. The countries on the left have a form at the DMV that looks something like this. "Check the box below if you want to participate in the organ donor program." And what happens? People don't check, and they don't join. The countries on the right, the ones that give a lot, have a slightly different form. It says, "Check the box below if you don't want to participate ..." Interestingly enough, when people get this, they again don't check, but now they join.

Now, think about what this means. You know, we wake up in the morning and we feel we make decisions. We wake up in the morning and we open the closet; we feel that we decide what to wear. We open the refrigerator and we feel that we decide what to eat. What this is actually saying, is that many of these decisions are not residing within us. They are residing in the person who is designing that form. When you walk into the DMV, the person who designed the form will have a huge influence on what you'll end up doing.

Now, it's also very hard to intuit these results. Think about it for yourself. How many of you believe that if you went to renew your license tomorrow, and you went to the DMV, and you encountered one of these forms, that it would actually change your own behavior? Very hard to think that it would influence us. We can say, "Oh, these funny Europeans, of course it would influence them." But when it comes to us, we have such a feeling that we're in the driver's seat, such a feeling that we're in control and we are making the decision, that it's very hard to even accept the idea that we actually have an illusion of making a decision, rather than an actual decision.

Now, you might say, "These are decisions we don't care about." In fact, by definition, these are decisions about something that will happen to us after we die. How could we care about something less than about something that happens after we die? So a standard economist, somebody who believes in rationality, would say, "You know what? The cost of lifting the pencil and marking a 'V' is higher than the possible benefit of the decision, so that's why we get this effect."

But, in fact, it's not because it's easy. It's not because it's trivial. It's not because we don't care. It's the opposite. It's because we care. It's difficult and it's complex. And it's so complex that we don't know what to do. And because we have no idea what to do, we just pick whatever it was that was chosen for us.

I'll give you one more example. This is from a paper by Redelmeier and Shafir. And they said, "Would this effect also happen to experts? People who are well-paid, experts in their decisions, and who make a lot of them?" And they basically took a group of physicians. They presented to them a case study of a patient. They said, "Here is a patient. He is a 67-year-old farmer. He's been suffering from right hip pain for a while." And then, they said to the physicians, "You decided a few weeks ago that nothing is working for this patient. All these medications, nothing seems to be working. So you refer the patient for hip replacement therapy. Hip replacement. Okay?" So the patient is on a path to have his hip replaced.

Then they said to half of the physicians, "Yesterday, you reviewed the patient's case, and you realized that you forgot to try one medication. You did not try ibuprofen. What do you do? Do you pull the patient back and try ibuprofen? Or do you let him go and have hip replacement?" Well, the good news is that most physicians in this case decided to pull the patient and try ibuprofen. Very good for the physicians.

To the other group of physicians, they said, "Yesterday when you reviewed the case, you discovered there were two medications you didn't try out yet—ibuprofen and piroxicam." You have two medications you didn't try out yet. What do you do? You let him go, or you pull him back? And if you pull him back, do you try ibuprofen or piroxicam? Which one? Now, think of it: This decision makes it as easy to let the patient continue with hip replacement, but pulling him back, all of the sudden it becomes more complex. There is one more decision. What happens now? The majority of the physicians now choose to let the patient go for a hip replacement. I hope this worries you, by the way—when you go to see your physician. The thing is that no physician would ever say, "Piroxicam, ibuprofen, hip replacement. Let's go for hip replacement." But the moment you set this as the default, it has a huge power over whatever people end up doing.

I'll give you a couple of more examples on irrational decision-making. Imagine I give you a choice: Do you want to go for a weekend to Rome, all expenses paid—hotel, transportation, food, a continental breakfast, everything—or a weekend in Paris? Now, weekend in Paris, weekend in Rome—these are different things. They have different food, different culture, different art. Imagine I added a choice to the set that nobody wanted. Imagine I said, "A weekend in Rome, a weekend in Paris, or having your car stolen?"

It's a funny idea, because why would having your car stolen, in this set, influence anything?

But what if the option to have your car stolen was not exactly like this? What if it was a trip to Rome, all expenses paid, transportation, breakfast, but it doesn't include coffee in the morning? If you want coffee, you have to pay for it yourself, it's two Euros 50.

Now in some ways, given that you can have Rome with coffee, why would you possibly want Rome without coffee? It's like having your car stolen. It's an inferior option. But guess what happened? The moment you add Rome without coffee, Rome with coffee becomes more popular, and people choose it. The fact that you have Rome without coffee makes Rome with coffee look superior, and not just to Rome without coffee—even superior to Paris.

Here are two examples of this principle. This was an ad in The Economist a few years ago that gave us three choices: an online subscription for 59 dollars, a print subscription for 125 dollars, or you could get both for 125.

Now I looked at this, and I called up The Economist, and I tried to figure out what they were thinking. And they passed me from one person to another to another, until eventually I got to the person who was in charge of the website, and I called them up, and they went to check what was going on. The next thing I know, the ad is gone, no explanation.

So I decided to do the experiment that I would have loved The Economist to do with me. I took this and I gave it to 100 MIT students. I said, "What would you choose?" These are the market shares—most people wanted the combo deal. Thankfully, nobody wanted the dominant option. That means our students can read.

But now, if you have an option that nobody wants, you can take it off, right? So I printed another version of this, where I eliminated the middle option. I gave it to another 100 students. Here is what happened: Now the most popular option became the least popular, and the least popular became the most popular.

What was happening was the option that was useless, in the middle, was useless in the sense that nobody wanted it. But it wasn't useless in the sense that it helped people figure out what they wanted. In fact, relative to the option in the middle, which was get only the print for 125, the print and web for 125 looked like a fantastic deal. And as a consequence, people chose it. The general idea here, by the way, is that we actually don't know our preferences that well. And because we don't know our preferences that well, we're susceptible to all of these influences from the external forces: the defaults, the particular options that are presented to us, and so on.

One more example of this. People believe that when we deal with physical attraction, we see somebody, and we know immediately whether we like them or not, if we're attracted or not. This is why we have these four-minute dates. So I decided to do this experiment with people. I'll show you images here, no real people, but the experiment was with people. I showed some people a picture of Tom, and a picture of Jerry. And I said, "Who do you want to date? Tom or Jerry?" But for half the people, I added an ugly version of Jerry. I took Photoshop and I made Jerry slightly less attractive.

For the other people, I added an ugly version of Tom. And the question was, will ugly Jerry and ugly Tom help their respective, more attractive brothers? The answer was absolutely yes. When ugly Jerry was around, Jerry was popular. When ugly Tom was around, Tom was popular.

This of course has two very clear implications for life in general. If you ever go bar-hopping, who do you want to take with you?

You want a slightly uglier version of yourself. Similar, but slightly uglier.

The second point, or course, is that if somebody invites you to bar hop, you know what they think about you.

Now you get it.

What is the general point? The general point is that, when we think about economics, we have this beautiful view of human nature. "What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason!" We have this view of ourselves, of others. The behavioral economics perspective is slightly less "generous" to people; in fact, in medical terms, that's our view.

But there is a silver lining. The silver lining is, I think, kind of the reason that behavioral economics is interesting and exciting. Are we Superman, or are we Homer Simpson?

When it comes to building the physical world, we kind of understand our limitations. We build steps. And we build these things that not everybody can use, obviously.

We understand our limitations, and we build around them. But for some reason, when it comes to the mental world, when we design things like healthcare and retirement and stock markets, we somehow forget the idea that we are limited.

I think that if we understood our cognitive limitations in the same way we understand our physical limitations, even though they don't stare us in the face the same way, we could design a better world, and that, I think, is the hope of this thing.

Thank you very much.

播放本句

登入使用學習功能

使用Email登入

HOPE English 播放器使用小提示

  • 功能簡介

    單句重覆、重複上一句、重複下一句:以句子為單位重覆播放,單句重覆鍵顯示綠色時為重覆播放狀態;顯示白色時為正常播放狀態。按重複上一句、重複下一句時就會自動重覆播放該句。
    收錄佳句:點擊可增減想收藏的句子。

    中、英文字幕開關:中、英文字幕按鍵為綠色為開啟,灰色為關閉。鼓勵大家搞懂每一句的內容以後,關上字幕聽聽看,會發現自己好像在聽中文說故事一樣,會很有成就感喔!
    收錄單字:框選英文單字可以收藏不會的單字。
  • 分享
    如果您有收錄很優秀的句子時,可以分享佳句給大家,一同看佳句學英文!